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Next Regular Meeting
Monday, December 5, 1927, at 12:15
P.M., at the Chamber of
Commerce Dining
Room.
This meeting will be held under the
auspices of the Committee on Criminal Jurisprudence of the Denver Bar
Association.
Harry S. Silverstein, Chairman,
will preside.
Philip S. Van Cise will speak on
The National Crime
Commission.

H

L

Y

No. 12

LANDON ABSTRACT CO.
In Its New Home

221 FIFTEENTH ST.

NEAR
COURT
PLACE

NOT quite settled yet, but
prepared to serve you.
BY the way, have you tried
our "Elbow Service"?
Try It-Phone Main 1175

FOUR COUNTY SERVICE
Adams, Arapahoe, Denver, Jefferson

LANDON ABSTRACT CO.
J. G. HOUSTON, President
M. H. OAKES, Secretary-Manager

GOLDING FAIRFIELD, Vice President
FRANK N. BANCROFT, Treasurer
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November Meetings
1.

DEAN POUND DINNER

Semi Centennial Celebration
The courtesy of Doctor George
Norlin, President of the University,
and the accommodating spirit of
Dean Roscoe Pound gave the association the inspiration for an extra
meeting during November.
The meeting and dinner in honor
of Roscoe Pound, Dean of the Harvard Law School, was called to order
by the President at 8:20 P. M. at the
University Club.
Mr. Stearns remarked that owing
to the arrival of many dignitaries
and celebrities in Colorado, for the
purpose of attending and supplementing the celebration to be held
at the State University, Colorado had
become the mecca for the intelligentia of the country, and called atten-

tion to the fact that that same situation prevailed at the banquet as not
less than six Deans were present.
They were Dean Pound, Dean Folsom, Dean Barry, Dean Murray, Dean
Wolcott and Dean Rogers.
Mr. Fred G. Folsom, introduced as
the former Colorado football coach
long identified with the University
of Colorado. He is acting Dean of
the Law School of that institution.
Dean Folsom, in commencing his
remarks, stated that Dean Pound had
been invited last summer to deliver
the commencement address at Colorado University.
That though it
was the custom of the University to
confer a degree upon prominent
speakers on such occasions, this
could not very well be done with
Dean Pound, as he already had his
fun share of degrees, he having ob-
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tained his AB at the age of 18 and
his MA degree a year later at Nebraska, and had received honorary
degrees as Doctor of Laws at the
Universities of Nebraska, Missouri,
Chicago, Michigan, Harvard, Brown,
Cambridge, and at Union College.
Dean Folsom then spoke a few
words in memory of Dean John D.
Fleming, whose glorious career ended with his death last summer, and
added that the place left vacant by
Dean Fleming could never be filled.
Speaking then of Dean Pound,
Folsom stated that no matter what
subject our guest from Harvard University had chosen for his address,
it would be entertaining and instructive, so well versed is he in both
legal and lay subjects. Dean Folsom
stated that he would not introduce
Dean Pound, as no introduction was
necessary, but would welcome "the
all-American Dean of Law Schools"
on behalf of the Denver Bar Association, the University of Colorado,
Denver University, and Westminster Law School.
Dean Pound's speech will be printed in full in The Record.
-J. R. A.
If.

JOINT MEETING WITH LAW
CLUB

About one hundred and seventy
persons were in attendance at the
joint meeting of the Bar Association
and the Law Club when President
Stearns called the meeting to order
at 12:50 on Monday, November 14,
1927.
Ex Post Facto Publications
President Stearns, having first announced the occasion of the meeting,
took occasion before the commencement of the program to call upon
Mr. Leroy McWhinney, chairman
of the Legislative Committee, who
reported and moved the adoption of
the resolution designed to remedy

the delay in the publication of the
Session Laws. The report and recommended resolution of Mr. McWhinney's committee having been
previously published in the Record,
he referred to the two ideas embodied for the enforcement of the
time provision for the publication,
the first being a penalty for delay
assessed to the party responsible for
the publication and second being
allotment of such responsibility to a
new officer.
Judge
McDonough
moved
an
amendment substituting a ninety-day
allowance for the sixty-day prepublication period allowed in the original
resolution.
Procrastinating Printers
The amendment was accepted by
Mr. McWhinney and Mr. Edward C.
King, member of the committee and
author of the resolution, but was objected to by Mr. Lawrence Lewis,
who made reference to the potential
technical speed but coincident procrastination inherent in the printing
trade. Upon vote the amendment
was lost but the original resolution
was carried.
The Twice Unvacant Chair
Mr. Stearns then referred briefly
to the now traditional practice of
the Denver Bar Association in holding a joint meeting once a year with
the Law Club under the auspices of
the latter organization and he, thereupon, introduced Mr. Will Shafroth,
president of that body.
Mr. Shafroth referred to his organization as a group of young men
who, as such, were inclined to take
themselves seriously. As a consequence, he expressed his hope that
the forthcoming program would
avoid the frivolous character which
he described as marking the previous meetings of the Bar Association. Referring to the selected topic
,of the program, "The Issues of the
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dience, "are as competent to judge
Campaign," he claimed the merit of
as he be."
impartiality in the choice by the
It was always interesting to him,
Law Club of its representative
Mr. Toll remarked, "to be present at
speakers; since, he said, while the
a meeting where a tail was wagging
principal speaker, Mr. Walker had
a dog," and he referred to himself
presided at the Democratic Convenas one of the Law Club wags.
tion at which Judge White's "Crown
of Corn and Cross of Old Crow"
Mules, Elephants, Camels, and Kangaroos
speech had brought him the nominaHe was reminded of the first time
part
tion, Mr. Henry Toll, the other
Cockness woman saw the kanthe
of the program, on the other hand,
at a London zoo. Upon findgaroo
though he did not preside at the
ing the animal marked and catacommittee meeting which had "Finlogued as a "native of Australia"
ished Findlay Finally", was yet of
she was horrified to recall that the
such a political complexion that, "if
description fitted her sister's husthe G. 0. P. was to be hitched to the
band. Mr. Walker, he said, was a
water wagon, he, Toll, would be
"native of the Western Slope."
found riding either the wagon or
The issues of this campaign, said
the elephant."
Mr. Toll, he had heard intelligently
Toll on Circumstantial Evidence
discussed on one previous occasion.
That, he said, was when Mr. Joseph
He thereupon turned over the
Sampson of the Denver Bar and the
floor to Mr. Henry Toll who addressDenver City Club had commented on
ed himself to the "Messrs. President,
the divergent popular appeals disCandidates, and Voters at large."
tinguishing the respective subjects
He said that he had considered a
of farm relief and thirst relief. This
period of twenty minutes for the durwas characterized by Mr. Toll as
ation of his speech introducing Mr.
part of Mr. Sampson's dry humor.
Walker, but that, upon his consultaIt was, remarked the speaker, "the
tion with that gentleman, the latter
battle of the white mule and the
had protested such time to be too
white elephant and hence it was apshort to do justice to the subject.
propriate that one of the standard
Mr. Walker had further advised
bearers should be Judge White. The
him,. according to Mr. Toll, that he,
latter, he said, designed to give the
Walker, would cover the Republican
mule a double kick."
side of the case; and, in the view of
He announced Mr. Walker as "the
Mr.
table,
head
at
the
waitress
the
Brother of the Grand Junction SenWalker was apparently designed to
tinel and, himself, the scout on the
cover that side and no other, since
Eastern slope."
she had, without special request,
In a campaign, said the speaker,
supplied him with a tumbler of eminently innocuous milk which Mr. Toll
of the hip-pocket against the hypo,
lifted and displayed, its major concrite, he sensed a primal conflict in
tent being still unpartaken, observhimself. His heart, he said, was
ing that the audience as the jury
loyal to the Republican party but
might judge the sincerity of the last
his throat was Democratic.
aforementioned statement of Mr.
Under Which King Bezoman
Walker by the fact of its consumpThe rostrum was thereupon yieldtion or non-consumption taking into
to Mr. R. Hickman Walker, who,
ed
circumstances.
the
all
consideration
in his customary inimitable style of
"You," suggested Mr. Toll to the au-
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soft spoken elocution and devastating rhetoric, proceeded upon his exposition of the Issues of the Campaign.
He characterized his situation as
ticklish and emphasized the fact
that in accepting the request of
the Law Club to speak he had entered upon no guarantee to still his
conviction or conceal his preferences
but would "boldly announce" that he
stood in favor of the candidacy of
Judge S. Harrison White.
The Root of all Evil
He acknowledged, however, that
there was a good man against Judge
White, for whom he, the speaker,
had always had a high regardGeorge Kindel.
The latter had, he said, a dependable one track mind, which had
analytically dissected the true question of the campaign as regards prohibition to a question of the long and
short haul or why a one thousand
ton haul of bootleg gin from Kansas
City should cost as much as the
same service from New York. He
was a candidate who, said the speaker, professed to find the real remedy
for the vexatious Volstead issue in
a lower freight rate on tomatoes.
Leave, 0, Leave us not Alone
Mr. Walker claimed to sense a
vast humanitarian objection to the
election of Senator Knauss, the Republican congressional candidate,
expressing his, the speaker's, fear in
the famous poetic strains which sing
the diurnal plaint of new widows
and orphans. Should these, queried
the speakers, be deprived of their
guardian ad litem?
"That Memory may their deed redeem
When like our rye, our gin is gone."
In eloquent lines, Mr. Walker
painted contrasting pictures of the
"suspicious meeting of the Republi-

can Convention in an elevator in the
Cosmopolitan Hotel to nominate a
vacancy committee" as against "the
gathering of the hosts of Democracy
for a statistical debate upon the infants mothered by drunken mothers,
attended by Judge Dunklee, Wayne
Williams and the speaker." He expressed the wish of some that this
historic gathering might have "fired
the shot heard round the world at
another Concord in a new war of
liberation." It was designed according to his comment to bring relief to
"lips parched by Pategonian Winds"
and rescue the thirsty "if any such
there need be," in New York and
Philadelphia.
The campaign thus opened, he described as "epithetic" and one which,
in its attempt to relieve the throat,
was subversive of the tongue. He
referred to the anguish of Wayne
Williams occasioned by journalistic
declaration that Judge White had,
by his speech, "Bryanized the Democratic convention." He commented
upon the many parodoxes which the
campaign had produced.
It had even become, he said, uncertain whether Christ had turned
the water into wine or wine into
water. The point seemed to the
speaker to have been reached where
"nothing is but what is not."
The Desiccated and the Moist
Even the old terms "wet" and
"dry" were not, according to Mr.
Walker, what they used to be and
he proceeded to indulge in some
classifications of both wets and drys.
There was, he said, the "wet
proper" who wanted his liquor, then
there was, he said the "wet liberal"
who professed to be devoid of any
appetite himself but believed that
others should have it if they wanted
it; and Mr. Walker commented upon the fact that proponents of this
character were usually to be found
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in large numbers where their colleagues, the wets proper, were availing themselves of the privileges
which they, the wets liberal, thus
designed to secure them.
There were also, he said, distinctions between wets in points of degree, being for instance the wet who
made no distinction between the
source of alcohol as coming from
vine, grain, or fruit and those who
favored wines and the "Laboring
man's Beer" using the latter description in its most universal and catholic significance.
In his analysis of the drys he described the members of the first
category as those who believed that
the liquor traffic should be denounced by but one law "the law of the
same sovereign which prohibited
murder and other venial offences."
Men in this category he described as
worshippers of age and fetiches and
he pictured the criminal law researches of the antiquarian of the
future, who would, he said, find the
anathema of the Constitution of the
United States directed against only
one offence and that the indulgence
of a physical appetite.
Drys of this class, he believed,
were regarded by other drys not
even as angels with atrophied wings,
but as former brewers in disguise.
For these other drys, he said, desired the indulgence of alcoholic
beverages to be under the ban of all
laws whatever. They would start,
he said with the town ordinance,
then they would prohibit it by the
statute law of the state proceeding
next with national enactment and
finding at last a supreme regret that
the United States had not entered
the League of Nations to the end
that the offence of bootlegging
might be tryable in the World Court.
There were also, he said, the drys
"proper" and the drys "vicarious."
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The former were numerous and sincere, the latter were numerous. The
latter, he said, professed to sympathize with the spirit of the law in
aiming to prevent previous excesses
inapplicable to themselves, who do
not drink to excess but profess concern to regulate the habits of their
weaker brethren, albeit at some personal inconvenience to themselves.
The Rule in Shelley's Case
"What," asked Mr. Walker, "is an
issue?" He described a local option fight in his native haunt where
he witnessed a parade of children
bearing a banner with the slogan:
"We are the Issue." He defined an
issue in a law suit as a controverted
question of fact; but here, he said,
the facts had nothing to do with the
case. A political issue, he defined,
as a proposition of policy adduced
by one side and opposed by the
other and which is designed of effectuation by the election of the sucIn the present
cessful candidate.
campaign the declaration of Judge
White in favor of the mollification
of the Volstead act was enough he
said, in the view of his opponents,
to warrant the vocal rally of the
Anti-saloon League against his candidacy; but entirely insufficient, in
the same view, to warrant a realignment of wet Republicans. In the
Republican claim, said the speaker,
the issue was Denver's Prosperity;
and he noticed the contention that
it would be futile for one representative of whatever political fusion
to attempt the modification of the
Volstead Act, but that a lone Democrat in a Republican Congress was
a terrible menace to the tariff.
It had been timidly advanced, suggested the speaker, that the real issue was the Boulder Dam but this
was a local issue to be settled by
the citizens of Boulder.
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The Prophet Unprofited
Out of the book of Exodus the
speaker shuddered for the Democratic candidate in his Mosaic garb
fearing lest his followers out of the
land of bondage should cry forthwith for the flesh pots of Egypt and
say "what shall we drink?" And
that the streams gushing from the
rocks stricken by his rod might disappear in the desert at the State
line. The election, said the speaker,
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was in reality a plebiscite and the
church bells to ring on the morrow,
"as though for a new St. Bartholomew's Day," were not, in the view
of the speaker, ringing for the tariff
or the Boulder Dam, however well
they might
At the conclusion of the address
Mr. Shafroth took occasion to thank
Mr. Walker and the meeting adjourned.
-V. A. M.

Redeeming The Bar
By JACOB J. LiEBIP.,MN, of the Los Angeles Bar (formerly of Denver)

ciation is no more. In its place
HE
State Barcreated
Assois a California
public corporation
by the act of the California Legislature of 1927, known as "The State Bar
of California". In other words, California now has an incorporated Bar
headed by a Board of Governors. The
first Governors are the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court of the State of
California, and four members appointed by the Chief Justice from the Bar
of the State at large. These first Governors constitute the State Bar Cofamission whose duty it is to place the
State Bar act in operation. The first
meeting of this Commission has been
called for November 18th.
In the
meantime elections have been held in
accordance with this act throughout
the State, to make up the first official
Board of Governors, succeeding the
State Bar Commission. The meeting
of November 18th is the organization
meeting of the new public body known
as the- State Bar of California, and it
will consist of one member elected
from each Congressional District of
the State of California, and four members elected from the State at large,
who shall hold office for the period of
one year, and until its successors are

elected and qualified. There are eleven
Congressional Districts in California,
therefore, the permanent Board of
Governors will consist of fifteen members, who will, at this organization
meeting, and annually thereafter, elect
their officers consisting of a President,
three Vice-Presidents, Secretary and
Treasurer. The latter two officers
need not be members of the State Bar.
The act provides-"that the State
Bar shall be governed by the Board of
Governors," which shall be charged
with the executive functions of the
State Bar and enforcement of the provisions of the State Bar act, and shall
have the power to appoint such committees, officers and employees as it
may deem necessary or proper, including local administrative committees,
and shall likewise have "power to aid
in the advance of the science of juris
prudence, and in the improvement of
the administration of justice."
Another power of great importance
and great significance is that which
this Board has, subject to the approval
of the Supreme Court and to the provisions of the act, to fix and determine
the qualifications for admission to
practice law in the State, and to constitute and appoint a committee of
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not more than seven members with
power to examine applicants, and recommend to the Supreme Court for admission to practice law those who fulfill the requirements.
The present
rules for admission to practice continue only until such time as the Board
of Governors shall, with the approval
of the Supreme Court, adopt new rules.
In view of the recent influx of Denver
lawyers to Los Angeles, this causes
the writer to note here the caution to
those who may be contemplating a
similar step, that delay may be costly,
for no one can predict what the Board
of Governors may do about establishing regulations for admission to the
Bar from a foreign State. At present
an attorney in good standing of any
other State may be admitted upon motion and proper recommendations
after investigation by the Bar Examining Board.
Another extremely broad and powerful weapon placed in the hands of the
Board of Governors is the power to
disbar members or to discipline them
by reproval, public or private, or by
suspension from practice, and to pass
upon all petitions for reinstatement,
subject to review by the Supreme
Court, provided a petition be filed with
the Supreme Court for a review of the
decision of the Board of Governors
within sixty days after the decision
shall have been filed with the Supreme
Court, and the burden is placed upon
the petitioner to show wherein such
decision is erroneous or unlawful. The
Board is given power, subject to the
laws of the State, to formulate and declare rules and regulations necessary
or expedient for the carrying out of
the act, and to adopt rules and regulations, which, when approved by the
Supreme Court, shall be binding upon
all members of the State Bar, and the
willful breach of any such rules shall
be punishable by suspension from the
practice of law for a period not to exceed one year, although this power of

suspension, etc., has been given to
this Board, the present powers of the
Courts to hear disbarment cases, are
not to continue. The Board of Governors is given the power of compelling
attendance of witnesses and the production of books, papers and documents pertaining to matters under investigation, or to the trial or hearing.
No member of the Bar of the State
of California, who fails to register with
the State Bar prior to its annual meeting, will be allowed to practice law in
the State of California, and thereafter
no person shall practice law unless he
shall be an active member, in good
standing, in the State Bar, which of
course includes the prompt payment
of annual membership fee.
The registration in connection with
the organization of this new State Bar
has revealed some interesting figures,
showing 7,872 lawyers practicing in
the State of California who have registered in time to participate in the first
election for the Board of Governors.
Of these 2,738 are practicing in the
City of Los Angeles, with 499 lawyers
in Los Angeles County outside of the
City of Los Angeles. This means that
there are at least as many lawyers
actively engaged in the practice of law
in the State, County and City aforesaid as have so far registered. Undoubtedly more will awaken at the last
moment to the realization of the importance of their enrollment in the
new organization.
In view of the organization of the
new State Bar, and in view of the
powers which were given to it, by the
legislature, the California State Bar
Association, at its last meeting held
in September, by act of its members,
dissolved. The local bar associations
will, of course, continue as heretofore.
The incorporated Bar of the State of
California is the result of many years
of effort upon the part of the lawyers
of the State. The purpose of incorporating the Bar (and, therefore, the
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chief arguments used in its favor) are
briefly summarized thus:
1. To secure a better administration
of justice.
2. To place full responsibility upon
the bar, both as to qualifications
for admission to practice and conduct after admission.
3. To see that every lawyer recognizes "that one who practices law
holds a position of public trust
and that his primary duty is to be
faithful to that trust."
4. To organize the bar upon an efficient and businesslike basis.
The reasons for incorporation of the
Bar have suggested the title of this
article-"Redeeming the Bar".
The
desire for an incorporated Bar was
evidently the result of a desire so to
control the Bar as to redeem it in the
eyes of the world. In the words of
the Honorable Charles E. Hughes, "the
administration of justice is the concern
of the whole community, but it is the
special concern of the Bar. We are
ministers of justice and no lawyer is
worthy of any reputation in the profession, whatever his ability may be,
if he does not regard himself first and
last as a minister of justice in the
community in which he practices."
Mr. Hughes, in speaking of the objects of the organized bar, expresses
himself thus:
"To unify and make
more effective the support of the ethical standards of the profession; to
give expression to preponderant sentiment as against those who misrepresent the profession and bring it into
disrepute; to keep the streams of justice pure; to preserve the traditions
of an independent bar, zealous of individual liberty, resisting every encroachment of power, and demanding
and dignifying the service of an incorruptible bench; to achieve by unwearied and intelligent labor the removal
of obstacles to the speedy vindication
of individual and public rights."
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The fear which some lawyers have
as to the danger of such an incorporated bar, and perhaps the chief opposition to it, is that the great powers concentrated in the board of governors
will result in the formation of a machine so powerful as to dominate the
profession and dictate the selection
even of the members of the bench.
I understand that Alabama, North
Dakota, New Mexico and Idaho already
have incorporated bars, successfully
operating.
In keeping with the desire to redeem
the profession in the eyes of the public has been another measure now in
effect in the State of California. By
constitutional
amendment
adopted
November 2, 1926, the people of the
State of California created what is
known as a Judicial Council consisting
of the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, one associate Justice of the
Supreme Court, three Justices of the
District Courts of Appeal, four Judges
of the Superior Courts, one Judge of a
Police or Municipal Court, and one
Judge of an inferior court assigned by
the Chief Justice to sit thereon, for
terms of two years, of which the Chief
Justice or acting Chief Justice is Chairman.
It is the function of the Chairman to
expedite judicial business, and to
equalize the work of the Judges, and
he must make provision for the assignment of any Judge to any court of a
like or higher Justice to assist a court
or Judge whose calendar is congested,
to act as Judge who is disqualified or
unable to act, or to sit and hold court
where a vacancy in the office of Judge
has occurred.
Under these powers of the Chief
Justice, and of the Judicial Council, it
is hoped that one of the chief causes
of the failure of justice may be eliminated, to wit the laws delays, and the
bench and bar be thus both redeemed
in the eyes of the public.

THE DENVER

BAR ASSOCIATION RECORD

Until very recently a case at issue
in Los Angeles in which both parties
were ready for trial would normally
be set on the calendar for eighteen
months hence in the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County, although that
court has a Secretary whose business
it is to transfer cases from one Department to another, where, for example, one Court has several cases
ready for trial, and the calendar in
another court "blows up" leaving the
Department free to try other cases.
Recently one of these Departments
of the Superior Court in Los Angeles
County (which is the equivalent of the
District Court at Colorado)-and there
are now thirty-eight departments of
the Superior Court-was set aside to
handle what is known as the short
cause calendar cases being sent to this
department in which the parties agree
to submit the entire case within the
limitation of one hour. Already the
council has accomplished wonderful
results. The investigation and recommendations of the Judicial Council resulted in the legislature this year increasing the number of Judges in Los
Angeles County upon the Superior
Bench from twenty-eight to thirtyeight. Judges have been assigned
from the Superior Bench to the District courts of Appeals to relieve the
congestion, and Judges from outside
Counties have been assigned to the
larger Counties where the calendars
are congested, and during the summer
as many as ten outside Judges were
sitting at a time, assisting in hurrying
up the calendar. The Council is constantly
working
upon
suggested
changes in procedure, both criminal
and civil. The clouds of congestion are
still darkening the horizon in the Los
Angeles Court, and in the appellate
courts, but the light of relief is commencing to shine through, and unless
litigation increases disproportionately
California will, before long, have a

situation where justice may be obtained within a reasonable time.
(In view of the constantly Increasing
intercourse, commercially and otherwise,
between Colorado and California, request
has been made that the writer furnish
the Denver Bar Record with a series of
articles throwing light upon such differences between the law and procedure of
the two States as may be of interest or of
value to the Bar of Denver. This is the
first of the series.)

Communications
A gentleman who follows closely the
proceedings of the Committee on Protessional Ethics has, in a communication touching upon some of the questions previously presented for the Committee's opinion, taken occasion to submit the following to the chairman:
"I am always embarrassed by the
word "ethical". In my own mind
dcgrees of lawyers' undesirable conduct are ranked: undignified, unprofessional, unethical, and unbearable.
Piacing any given conduct in its
class is often difficult, but I have
specific conduct in mind for defining
each class:
"UndignifiedCarrying the breakfast egg
to his office on his coat.
"UnprofessionalRefusing a case because
there is little or no money
in it.
"UnethicalExpressing a public opinion
as if an uninfluenced opinion when in fact his opinion
is influenced.
"UnbearableLying, cheating."
Believing the classification indicated
may be of interest to readers the point
is passed on to the Record.
E. D. UPHAM
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Address By Roscoe Pound
Dean of HarvardLaw School
At Dinner at The University Club, Denver, Colo., Wednesday, November 2, 1927
By Courtesy of C. P. Gehman, Shorthand Reporter

I

while I was listening to your presiWAS doing a little calculating
dent; and, if university presidents
and deans have been discharged here
into this community at the rate of
three a minute this afternoon, you can
see by a little figuring that there is
liable to be some sort of an avalanche
of learning.
But I was less alarmed at that rate
of discharge-which is the term you
use in your irrigation law out here,
isn't it?-when I reflected that some
of us at least, are not here in that
capacity. Dean Fulsom seemed to indicate that I was out here to collect
something that was due me. I confess
I did not know that I had come out
here on a bill collecting errand, but I
have been in Denver in times past on
that errand, and if there is anything
due I shall not go until I have collected
it, and shall carry it back with me!
One gets a bit used to post-prandial
introductory oratory, even when sometimes the speaker gets a bit Fulsome!
(Laughter)
I often think of a story
that I heard from a president of the
South Carolina Bar association some
years ago when I was a guest of that
association.
The president of the association told
us about his colored butler, who asked
for a night off to go to lodge. "Why,"
the master said, "Sam you don't need
to go to the lodge; they can run the
lodge without you." "No, they can't
run the lodge, Marse John; they can't
run the lodge without Sam," he said.
"How is that, Sam, are you the master?" "Oh, no, Marse John, I'se not
the master; I'se only the Supreme

High King, and there is seven officers
(Laughter)
above me!"
I thought I would try to speak to
you on the subject of law and laws,
and leading up to that subject I was
going to suggest to you that we are
in a time of transition, when It occurred to me that, when I was a student in the University of Nebraska,
from which I graduated in the year
1888-a good while ago-we then
thought that we were in a stage of
transition. I suppose in a sense everything is always in a state of transition.
But it is sometimes, perhaps, more in
a state of transition than at other
I suppose the truism that
times.
everything falls is emphatically true
of life.
The very essence of life is change;
and the social order that is today with
life is bound to reflect that change
which constitutes life, and the law,
which is a specialized form of social
control, cannot but itself be continually to a greater or less extent in a
condition of change.
But I suppose we have today in the
law as everwhere else to mediate between the need of stability and the
need of change, and the economic order in which your civilization has culminated calls for stability, which presupposes general security. But it has
to do with life; it is an order of life;
it has to do with conduct, and every
item of conduct in a sense is unique.
And so we have always with us a
problem, as you might say, of mediating between a need of stability and a
need of change.
But at some times the balance in-
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clines toward change and at other
times toward stability. In the last
century it inclined very much toward
stability. At least we think so as we
look back at the last century. We did
not think so then. I remember there
used to be a college oration that went
through oratorical contests year by
year. Its title changed; its content
changed somewhat, but its main theme
was Progress. We did not talk so
much about transition then; we called
it progress.
And I remember that college oration
used to begin with Adam's fall, and it
traced progress down to Appomattox.
I suppose if the situation had been
located south of Mason and Dixon's
line a different terminus might have
been selected. But progress in the
year of our Lord 1888 for the latitude
and longitude of Nebraska had temporarily stopped at Appomattox; and
as I look back at that I think it was a
bit symbolical, because while we believe in progress, I suspect we had an
idea that from then on progress was
going to take the form of perfecting a
few details, the great outlines had
been pretty well worked out, and progress was going to consist in touching
up a detail here and touching up a
detail there.
As we look back now we can say
that the balance was on the side of
stability. Quite as definitely I think
one cannot but feel today it is inclined to the side of change.
I had occasion not so long ago to
look over note books that I kept as a
first year's student of law under some
very great teachers, and they were
very confident, and had just cause, I
suppose, to be confident that they had
got hold of the great fundamental,
eternal principles, and that those who
came after them would be merely
working those principles out in detail.
It is rather alarming to see what
has become of some of those princi-
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ples. You cannot be as sure of them
now as you could be thirty odd years
ago. In the course of a generation
many of them have simply disappeared from the legal map. Instead of
working out of details in the principles which now seem to be vital in
the law, which were hardly dreamed
of at that time, and yet we can look
back and, with a little logical acrobatics such as a teacher always has to
indulge in, we can demonstrate them
by authorities going clear back to the
Year Books.
Well, I am certainly safe -in saying
that we are in a time of transition,
and I suspect that transition plays a
very much larger part in the law, is
much more of a factor in the law today, than it was in the law a generation ago.
Now of the phenomena of this time
of transition, one that seems to me
peculiarly significant-if you would
like, impressive -is
that, with the
greatest respect for law, preaching respect for law up and down the line,
we are not so sure about laws.
A generation ago we believed that
law was an aggregate of laws, and yet
with all the praise that we have continually upon our lips for law, you find
relatively little praise for laws.
I was going to quote from a cowboy
version of Shakespeare that used to
be current when I was a student,
where Mark Antony, standing over the
body of Caesar is reported to have
said, "But, after all, boys, we do not
come here to praise Caesar, but to
bury the son-of-a-gun!"
I suppose there is no other country
in the world where there is such an
output of laws and such complaint of
laws when put forth as there is with
US.
We devote more energy to our lawmaking machinery, it is more continuously in action, there is more of it,
it is more complicated than I suppose
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any lawmaking machinery in the
world or that the world has ever seen,
and along with that machinery and
that output I suppose there is more
outcry about the laws when enacted
than there is anywhere in the world
or ever has been.
Now of course in a way that is relative if you take the great compilation
of the Emperor Justinian. There are
four parts. Two parts codify the traditional law, the jurist made law; and
two parts codify legislation. The legislation in the Code and the Novels
cannot run back more than two and
one-half centuries, and mostly runs
back two centuries, before Justinian's
time. The juristic part represents the
activities of Roman jurists for four
centuries. But, that half of that compilation represents a legislative activity of two centuries, suggests to us
that, after all, when we come to codify
our law, it will be some time before
half of that part of our law which we
conceive to be significant and worthy
of perpetuating will be legislative in
origin.
As to a good deal of our legislation
you can say about it what the freshman said about his hero in his theme,
when he said that he made himself
immortal for a great many years!
(Laughter) And yet it will not do for
us to sneer at legislation as we are
accustomed to do. It is said, and said
truly, that the conspicuous fact in the
American state is the energy of the
legislature; and if we look back at our
legal history we are bound to admit
that legislation has played no small
part in making our American law
what it is.
Let us go back to our formative era.
Think of the statutes that have entered into the very corpus of our
American law. We have almost forgotten that these things are statutory,
the statutes are so universal, they
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have been so generally adopted, and
have stood the test of time so well.
Take the way in which we made
over the law of real property in this
country in the Nineteenth century. A
great deal that we have thought of as
common law in this country was really legislation, beginning in New York
in 1795. Our whole law of descent
and distribution has been made over
in statutes that are substantially alike
all over the country. Our whole system of conveyancing is statutory. Our
homestead and exemption laws, almost universal-covering a great part
of the country at least-are statutory.
One can go on with a long list of
statutes; and a member of your bar
has pointed out as a result of very
valuable research how many of these
things go back to the time and how
much of them we owe to the genius of
They are great
Thomas Jefferson.
legislative achievements that are a
part of our everyday law; and it is
not to be said that modern legislation
does not play an important part in
our everyday administration of justice.
Why, at every turn the lawyer encounters statutes. There is not an
item of law that potentially may not
be and that actually is not affected by
legislative lawmaking. And yet, with
all that, our tendency is to ignore legislation or to treat it certainly very
lightly.
Take our legal education-it almost
ignores the existence of legislation. I
suppose there is not a law school in
the country of any pretensions that
has a course in statutory interpretation, a fairly important practical subject. Our legal schools ignore legislation. A few years ago we had a debate that was running up and down
the law schools of the land with reference to the nature of the res of a
beneficiary of a trust-were his rights
in rem or were they in personam?
And I remember on one occasion
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discussing this subject with a very
great law teacher, who has since attained one of the highest positions
upon the bench. I said to him, "Why,
take the case of a person who has an
unrecorded deed of conveyance to a
piece of land; he has legal title, but if
some one gets another conveyance
from the grantor and records it, taking for value without notice, he can
cut off those rights in rem of the owner by the- unrecorded conveyance."
"Oh, well," he said, "that is statutory."
Is our universal American institution of recording acts something to be
ignored in an analysis of an everyday legal situation?
Of course that viewpoint grows out
of our historical modes of thought in
the last century. The historical jurist
had no use for legislation. It did not
enter into his scheme of things. A
statute to him seemed to be a sort of
pathological growth in the law, that
we could leave out of account in our
consideration of its normal phenomena.
But take the writers of our text
books. Did it ever occur to you what
a contrast there is between the way
In which a practical text writer, writing a practical treatise for practical
men to use in their every day practical work, will deal with judicial decisions, and the way in which that
same text writer will deal with statutes?
Why, he would consider himself disgraced if there were a judicial decision in an English speaking country
from the seventeenth century to the
date on the title page of the book that
did not find a place somewhere in his
foot notes. But as to the statutes, the
practitioner must look them up for
himself as best he can-they do not
come within the purview of the work
of a legal scholar.
I always think of a vigorous old time
Federal judge, of the type that was

more common in this part of the world
when I came out here than It is now,
as he was delivering himself very vigorously from the bench one day an
oral opinion in which he was laying
down the law applicable to the case
with great force, occasionally by way
of a punctuation mark bringing down
his fist upon the bench.
As he proceeded with his forcible
exposition a member of the bar seeing
that things were not going the way he
conceived they ought to go, pulled
down a volume of the statutes and
opened the volume at a certain page
and handed it to an usher to take up
to the bench. The usher took it up
and laid it on the bench, but the judge
went on with his vigorous exposition
of the law, and then having reached
the end of a paragraph he picked up
this book and looked at it a momentthen looked at it again-looked at it
more carefully, then shut up the book
and put it down and went on, "But
they tell us there is a statute to the
contrary. Now what is a statute?
Words-mere words!
Judgment for
the plaintiff!"
(Laughter)
Well, I am afraid that has been the
attitude of the teachers of the law in
law schools, and of text writers; and
I do not know that it is any wonder
that legislation is not entirely a thing
for us to be proud of, when we insist
on dealing with it in that fashion.
As I have said, there is really nothing in the history of our law-not in
the history of our American law-to
lead us toward that attitude. Even in
the law of today, one of the great
achievements has been, has it not?
workmen's compensation - absolutely
a work of legislation, in which the law
making branches achieved the solution of something with which the
courts had been wrestling for a generation, with results that perhaps have
not entirely added to the respect for
judicial justice.

THE

DENVER

BAR ASSOCIATION

And yet there we have that situation. My impression is that our difficulties are not with legislation in and
of itself, much as we declaim against
the quantity of legislation. What we
really have to address our minds to
is quality of legislation; and that
quality I suspect is intermedially connected with the phenomena of a time
of transition.
Now it has been proposed that we
have a legislative holiday in some
states. Propositions have been made
to call special sessions of legislatures
for the purpose of repeal only, enacting nothing. Well, it would be an interesting thing if we could have the
short and simple statute books of a
hundred years ago. The statute book
in Michigan, and the statute book in
Ohio, have now, I believe, got to four
volumes.
The statute book in New
York occupies a shelf that is longer
than that balcony up there!
But we cannot as things are today
expect to go back to the old-time one
volume statute book. The points of
contact of man and man in the society
of today are too many. The things
that call for solution and call for solution immediately are too many. We
cannot wait. In a time when communication by airmail between Boston and Los Angeles is two days, we
cannot take the time to deal with
these questions that come up as we
did at a time when it took General
Grant going as a cadet from Ohio to
West Point nine days to make that
journey.
The mere circumstances of our* life
compel us to deal with things speedily, where a generation ago we waited
a slow process of judicial inclusion
and exclusion.
So I imagine that the statute book
is something that we have got to expect to have with us. In fact Montesquieu saw this long ago, when he
pointed out that an agricultural com-
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munity needed few laws and a commercial
community needed many.
That is even more true of an industrial community such as that in which
we live.
Our problem, I suspect, then, is not
one of quantity; it is one of quality.
There are some other things besides
quality to be taken into account. Did
you ever consider the difference between the sedulous way in which our
governments take care that the decisions of the courts be made accessible and the free and easy way in
which legislation is promulgated?
Take our Federal statute book, for
a generation after the revised statutes
of the early seventies, it became less
and less possible to say with assurance what Federal legislation was.
And what has congress thoughtfully
done for us recently? We now have
a private compilation, which by legislative enactment is prima facie evidence in our courts of the legislation
of the Federal government-prima
facie, but any of us are at liberty to
show that there is legislation that is
not there, or there is legislation there
that ought not to be.
I do not believe you will find a
parallel to that, situation since the
time of the ruler of antiquity who
carved his laws high up on a column,
out of sight, to enjoy the embarrassment of his subjects who were bound
by them but did not know what they
were!
What are the reasons for this attitude toward legislation? I think there
are three. It is to be accounted for
partly through a bit of history, a professional tradition. It is to be accounted for partly because our law
schools have always been professional
law schools and have echoed that professional tradition. But partly also it
is something connected neither with
the teaching of law nor with the practice of law, but very closely and in-

THE DENVER BAR ASSOCIATION
timately related to an old time American pioneer characteristic. Let us
look for a moment at each of these
things.
I said to you a moment ago that our
legal scholarship in the last generation was historical. Now the historical scholar in the science of law in
the last century did not have any intimate connection with history.
It always makes me think of a Greek
candy maker who attained some political importance in my native town
when I was a bit interested in politics,
and as Greeks came to town and became eligible for political activity he
always saw to it that they were taken
around and registered as republicans.
Mot of them had come to this country because their views in Greece
were republican, and Greece was a
monarchy; and he always explained to
them, republic and republicans, it is
the same thing! (Laughter)
Now the historical scholar and history were not the same thing. But the
historical jurist of the last century
conceived the law was something that
could not be made. It was something
that grew spontaneously, like language, as an idea of right or an idea
of justice released itself in the development of legal institutions, legal
proceedings, legal doctrines, and all
he could do was, as it were, to sit
upon the fence and observe, and could
no more by any conscious effort affect
the orbit of this development thanshall I say?-he could affect the
phases of the moon or the revolutions
of the planets.
That was a cheerful doctrine for the
era of mid-Victorian liberalism, when
at least in the part of the world where
I observed it, certain things had come
to a grand finale at Appomattox; but
it is a doctrine that has not been able
to hold its own in legal science in the
last 35 years.
More and more we become conscious
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that there are things that call for
effort, that we can do things and must
do things, and that this historical
dogma that preaches futility is simply
preaching a juristic optimism that Is
out of line with modern life.
But that is the way we were taught;
a statute is an attempt to do the impossible, it is a pathology, as I said,
an abnormal growth in the law. Now
we have got to make the best of it;
we have got to construe it, if it is in
derogation of the common law, strictly; we have got to fit it into our common law scheme, and one way or another we cannot regard it simply as a
futile effort to do something that cannot be done.
But along with that there was another factor, as I suspect, that operated even more vigorously in this country. As I said, our American law
teaching has always been professional.
It goes back to the very beginning of
the law teaching in English speaking
countries. The Inns of court had their
very origin in bodies of law students,
apprentices studying under the master.
It was an apprentice teaching that
brought apprentice teaching to this
country. The first law school in this
country, Judge Reeves' school, at
Litchfield, Connecticut, was nothing
but a glorified law office, and we havE
gradually brought those glorified la
offices under the eaves of universities;
but they have kept that tradition to
the present time.
Now in civil law countries that is
very different. The civil law has been
a body of written texts since at least
the fifth century when the writings of
the great Roman jurisconsults were
given legislative authority. The makers of the civil law have been teachers; their great books have been commentaries on written texts. And the
civilian Is always at his best when he
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is interpreting or applying or formulating a written text.
It has been very different with us.
The fundamental ideas of our law had
become pretty well fixed before we
had much if any legislation on legal
subjects in English speaking countries.
Ours is a tradition not of handling of
written texts but of finding the
grounds of decision in reported judicial experience.
The common law lawyer is usually
at his worst when he is called on to
apply or to formulate a written text;
and the law schools have simply reflected that attitude of the profession
that the real law is the traditional law,
that the life of the law is in the tradition and not in the written formulated
text.
But I think there is still another
reason, and that is our pioneer faith
in versatility. The pioneer had to be
versatile; he was versatile; he had to
be equal to all the emergencies of life.
If he could not do himself what had to
be done it had to be undone. He must
himself prove equal to every emergency that presented itself or he must
get off the earth or go back east where
he came from. It was not possible for
him to turn to a well-organized board
of health or board of house commissioners around the corner; he could
not write a letter to the department
of agriculture. He did not have even
the ordinary every day experts that
we regard as essential to our household emergencies sometimes within
miles. If a doctor was accessible it
was only, usually, after a long drive
to bring him to the place where he
was needed. It was necessary for the
pioneer to be versatile; he was versatile, and he conceived a sort of contempt for the specialist. I like to read
in Cooper's Pioneer about the way in
which the physician got his start in
the community. He would serve an
apprenticeship under the physician in
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a community, and does not seem to
have picked up very much in the ap,
prenticeship. A man got a bullet in
his hand and a physician used a jackknife to extract it; and by observation of how Indians and others dressed wounds, etc., he got his start in the
practice of the medical profession.
Well, that is the way things were
done and could be done in a pioneer
community. Experts did not seem to
be particularly necessary. The pioneer
conceived that any honest citizen, by
and large, was equal to anything that
had to be done in the community. He
learned to administer by administering. He observed, and he applied his
good sense to what little experience
there was and gradually picked up a
few simple problems.
Let us remember that it was a long
time before we thought it was necessary for a man to be a lawyer in order
to sit upon the highest courts In many
of our states. In New York the senate had ultimate appellate jurisdiction
until 1847. The decrees of Kent and
of Walworth were reversed, and you
can read the opinions of the senators
as they voted to reverse them. It is
interesting to notice that somehow or
other Johnson's Chancery ranks a little higher as an authority than Wendell's reports, in which Kent's and
Walworth's decrees were reversed.
It was not until 1847 in New York
that those who ultimately passed upon
writs of error and appeals were necessarily learned in the law. It was not
until 1857 in Rhode Island that the legislature gave up the last of its appellate jurisdiction. It was not unil
1874 in Pennsylvania that the legislature gave up its jurisdiction in divorce.
It was a long time before we conceived that any special preparation or
expertness was necessary for adjudication. Now I suggest to you that in
legislation we are in that stage still.

THE DENVER

BAR ASSOCIATION

We have learned in administration
that it is necessary at least to have
an expert in the background. If a
commission is composed of persons
who have no expert knowledge, there
Is a corps of experts behind the
scenes. We learned a long time ago
in adjudication the necessity of putting upon the bench men learned in
the law.
We have still to learn, and we have
got to learn pretty soon, if this outcry
about legislation means anything, that
behind this work of lawmaking there
must be expert processes and expert
prepar+* -- ' of which our ideals of
pioneer versatility took no account.
How is it that we do actually prepare, make smooth the paths, for legislative lawmaking?
Well, -of course
there are certain official agencies.
There are the judiciary committees
of the houses-I am speaking only of
legal matters, because that is all that
I am competent to talk about-there
are legislative reference bureaus;
there are arising over the country
judiciary councils.
Now those are
great institutions.
I expect to see
them do great things.
But their scope is relatively narrow.
There are certain unofficial agenciesthere are bar associations, state and
national. There is the American Law
Institute, the American Judicature Society, the Commercial Law League,
the Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws.
The bar associaions have done a
great deal. The Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws have given us
laws on commercial subjects some of
which seem to me to be models of
what legislative lawmaking should be.
The bar associations within certain
limits have done and are doing a great
deal. Take such matters as procedure, where lawyers are especially
competent, where they have a particular knowledge of the difficulties of
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the problems and of the materials with
which the solution is to be reached,
there they have done much. Consider
such things as the corporation law in
Ohio, under the auspices of the Ohio
State Bar association; the new rules
of court in Delaware, under the auspices of the Delaware Bar association; the things done by the American Judicature Society for judicial organization and administration; the
work done by the Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws-all these are
admirable.
But beside that there are certain
agencies with a less breadth of view,
a less grasp upon the problems, that
I suspect are in practice much more
effective. For every trade, every business, every profession, every sort of
organized activity, today has its national association, has its legislative
committee, has its annual or biennial
budget of bills, which it persistently
urges, and in the end is likely to be
able to put upon the statute book.
Now when the lawyer deals with
these purely legal problems he has one
great advantage. He is likely to have
in bar associations men who represent
every type of client in the community,
who know how a particular law will
affect their particular clients, who
will be watchful to see to it that nothing is put in there which will be prejudical to the interests with which he
is immediately concerned.
But I do not think that is as much
so as it used to be. We are getting
so specialized that the very necessities of our economical organization
are such that more and more we do
not have the type of lawyer we had a
hundred years ago, or in this part of
the world a generation ago, the roll
of whose clients was a cross section
of the community.
But by and large it is true that a
cross section of a bar association will
pretty nearly give you a cross section
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of the interests in a locality. And today the moment you get outside of
those associations you find a radically
different type of preparation for legislation. Let me give you an example.
All of you know, of course, the problem of interpleader, but let me put a
typical case. John Doe we will say is
a bachelor with some money, and he
rooms and boards in a boarding house
that is kept by Richard Roe and Mary
his wife. He runs up quite a bill
there. Richard and Mary disagree;
each claims to be operating the boarding house; each claims that John
shQuld pay him or her as the case
may be. Now if John is wealthy and
Mary good looking and Richard indigent, the chances are that two juries
in two separate actions, duly moved
by a benevolent desire more equitably
to distribute the economic surplus, will
find in each case for the plaintiff. Of
course the remedy is in equity in a
suit for interpleader. But that bill of
interpleader is hedged about with
many historical difficulties. There are
purely historical anomalies, one might
say, that beset that proceeding, historical limitations upon its scope.
Well, Congress undertook at the
last session to deal with that matter,
so far as the Federal courts are concerned, and it has given us a new
statute, which extends the scope of
Interpleader, and removes those historical obstacles in the case of insurance companies, surety companies and
fraternal
insurance
organizations.
Other courts are exactly where they
were before.
Well that is not all. Take another
subject that has made the law infinite
trouble, and that is the subject of
contributory negligence.
There are
no less than six different solutions of
contributory negligence In the books.
We have experimented in this country
one state or another with three or four
of them. The civil law has an entirely

different way of dealing with the matter, and the Roman jurists apparently
never could agree between two or
three distinct views.
Congress dealt with that matter
some time ago, and fifteen states have
dealt with it by legislation, and have
brought in a new doctrine for employes of railroad companies, or, In
Nevada, for employes in mines.
Now the solutions that have been
propounded judicially were applied
equally to the various problems. The
farmer with a lumber wagon or the
railroad company operating a freight
train were subject to the same rule.
But now we have this improved legislation the benefit of which accrues
simply to employes of railroad companies, or in Nevada, to employes of
mines. Now it is possible there is
something peculiar about that type of
employe, but I suspect the peculiarity
is that it is represented, or was represented before the lawmaking bodies,
by a vigorous organization.
But how those things affect
is really an interesting study,
it is something more than to
law for one type of litigant
other for another type.

the law
because
get one
and an-

Take a case that has been coming
up over and over again, ever since the
bankruptcy law of 1898. The Committee on Commercial Law of the American Bar Association is now engaged,
and it has been engaged off and on
for a long time on improvements in
the bankruptcy law. And what is one
of the things that trouble them? The
commercial lawyer is very apt in
thinking about a bankruptcy law to
have in his mind's eye the interests of
the general creditors.
Now equity
had certain doctrines about cases
where it conceived that it should impose a constructive trust or there
should be a lien, and the tendency in
this legislation, promoted by those
who had before their eyes the inter-
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ests of the general creditor, is to do
away with these equity doctrines and
bring everybody in on the basis of the
general creditors. But some how or
other the courts have always managed to read the doctrines of equity
back into the statute when they have
been legislated out.
Now it is easy to see why the courts
are conscious that there are two sides
to this situation. They are conscious
that this legislation is framed from one
standpoint only, and it is a most unfortunate situation, but a very real
situation, in our law, that you have
legislation drawn continually from the
standpoint of one interest, compelling
the courts by a process of interpretation or application or what you like
to bring into account the other interests, which ought to have been taken into account in the formulation of
the written text.
Now one could vouch any number of
cases of this sort; but I am always
afraid that I may hit upon something
that is locally controversial. I do not
know just what sort of statute you
have in this state. I did not have
time before I came on here to look at
your statutes. But I do not imagine
you are one of the states, of which
there are a few, that has a type of
material liens statute whereby one can
furnish material to a cost of five times
the amount of the contract between
the owner and the contractor and the
owner can find himself liable to pay
not the amount of his contract but
the amount that the material man
charged the contractor.
When you look into the history of
that legislation as I have looked into
it in a number of states, you find behind it the activities of a lumber dealers association.
Well, what are we going to do about
a situation of that kind? We have
got a situation where the professionals are not acting, the experts are not
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acting. You cannot blame the layman
for bringing to bear the power of his
organization to get something done.
In many of these situations it is necessary that something be done. It is a
situation that occurs in every walk of
life, over and over again.
It has happened that professions
have forgotten that they are practical
institutions, that they exist for practical purposes. Over and over again
charlatans and quacks have had to
teach the medical profession, have
had to wake it from a pedantic slumber. Over and over again volunteers
have had to remind the military profession that they are a practical profession.
I like to tell the story about the Hessians at the battle of Bennington,
highly trained, highly disciplined professional soldiers, sent on a forced
march to rescue their comrades, arrived on the field too late because, as
the commanding officer explained, on
account of the mud and the bad state
of the roads, it was necessary to halt
five times in a mile to dress ranks!
Then there was the naval commander of whom Captain Mahan tells in
his Great Naval Battles of the Eighteenth Century, who had his orders to
keep a certain number of cable lengths
behind the ship next ahead of him in
the order of battle, and he stood upon
the quarter deck so intent upon keeping his precise place in the line that
in the smoke and excitement of battle
he drove through the French line without firing a shot!
And we have to remember that in
the Civil war our professional naval
officers did not believe in the Monitor;
that it took lay pressure, lay ingenuity, lay creative energy, to really make
an efficient fighting machine out of
the navy.
Now some times we have to learn
these same things in our own profession, and we cannot wonder that the
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layman takes hold and does things
when for the reasons I have spoken of
or other reasons we are not doing
what we ought to be doing, we are
not organizing the creative energies
of our profession, we are leaving these
things to be done by some one else.
Well, what is it that we ought to
do? In a civil law country they would
say of course, "Set up a ministry of
Justice; clear away limiting jurisdictions." That has been urged in EngBentham
lish speaking countries.
urged it in England about 1830. Lord
Haldane urged it in the rather remarkable report which he presented to the
Judge
British Government in 1918.
Cardozo urged it in the report of the
commission of which he was a member in New York. But I am afraid
we shall not see Ministers of Justice
in our time in any English Speaking
jurisdiction. It is rather alien to the
genius of our institutions. We expect
these things to be done unofficially;
we are suspicious of official institutions of this kind, if for no other reason because we feel they are likely to
get into politics, and we are likely to
get the same sort of preparation that
we get at the present.
Well, if we cannot have ministers
of justice, is there anything in any
institution that we have got available
that we can turn in whole or in part
to that purpose? There are several
unofficial institutions springing up,
and there is one old existing, well
established institution in this country
that I should like to see put its shoulder to the wheel and try to do its
share, and that is the Law School.
I cannot but feel that we have been
negligent in allowing the situation to
grow up in America. While we have
been studying the Year Books and collecting large and expensive accumulations of Black Letter folios, I am
afraid we have let a very important
part of our duty get by us unnoticed.
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I make this observation because In
our universities we have the possibilities for something very like a ministry of justice. There are the trained
men; there are the scientific conditions of study; there is the secure
tenure, and there is the opportunity
of dealing with questions as a whole
and not in local fragments; there are
the opportunities for dealing with
questions without restrictions of jurisdiction or parties or venue.
And there you can bring together
more comprehensive faculties. Take
such subjects as promoters' liability,
or sales agencies, that are making a
great deal of trouble in some parts of
the country today. If those are to be
dealt with properly you will have to
bring something more than lawyers
into the field-economists, specialists
in those lines; perhaps specialists
from schools of business will have to
be brought into the work, and they are
there in the faculty of any great university.
So I say we have in our universities
right at hand the materials out of
which to make institutes for research
in preparation for a better and more
effective legislation.
Now I can conceive that a law
school has not done its whole duty
when it has turned out well trained
men to enter into the practice of their
profession.
If that is all that it is to do why
should a university maintain a law
school under its roof? Lawyers have
a work to do in bar associations and
in legislatures and as citizens in urging and promoting and explaining
measures that will make our administration of justice in the next generation as effective as it was in the last.
But I do not believe that law schools
will have done their full duty when
they have turned out men trained and
disposed to take up that work.
Just as our university is doing the
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work of research that has opened up
modern technical manufacture in almost every field of industry today,
why shouldn't they do the work of
research that shall be behind the making of our laws a more effective instrument.
I look forward to the time, and I
hope it will come speedily, when the
law school will feel that its duty is
not only to train practitioners, not
only to train men who will do their
work in bar associations and in legislatures and as advocates of proper
measures before the public that must
necessarily rely upon them, but I look
forward to the time when in law
schools up and down the land will be
doing this work of preparation that
must go before effective law making.
Think of the advantage that we
have. The country is so unified today
that these questions must be looked
at largely as nation-wide questions.
And yet we have a very natural and
a very wholesome fear of centralization. We are afraid of any centralized
national agency, with its possible bad
effect upon local institutions. But in
a locally respected university these
questions can be taken up in their
national aspects without any fear of
an attempt to efface the locality.
My hope is that we need not wait
for ministers of justice to take this
up but that our law schools will take
the burden of this work upon themselves also, and that they will do for
legislation in the time before us what
they did for the traditional element
of our law in time past. (Applause)

The Reason
Mistress: "So your matrimonial life
was very unhappy. What was the
trouble? December wedded to May?"
"Lan' sake, no,
Chloe Johnson:
mai!
It was Labor Day wedded to
de Day of Rest!"
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Wanted
Copies of the Journals for the
11th Session (1876) of the House
and of the Council of the Legislative Assembly of the Territory
of Colorado. Communicate with
Editors. Telephone Main 1234.

Notice
Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler, President of Columbia University, will
deliver two addresses in Denver on
Monday, December 12, under the auspices of The Foundation for the Advancement of the Social Sciences of
the University of Denver.
The first of these occasions will be
at luncheon at the Cosmopolitan Hotel
at 12:10 P. M., to which all members
of the Bar Association are invited.
$1.00 per plate. Dr. Butler will speak
on "The Path to Peace."
The second occasion will be at the
Municipal Auditorium at 8:30 P. M.,
to which the public generally is invited.
Dr. Butler's subject in the evening
will be "The International Mind."
On account of limited seating facilities, it is necessary to make reservations for each of these occasions,
through the office of the Foundation
at the University of Denver, by letter
or telephone. Seats will be reserved
in the order of application.

New Members
The following applicants have been
approved by the Membership Committee of The Denver Bar Association and
will be voted upon at the meeting to
be held on December 5, 1927:
Hyman D. Landy
Fred Y. Holland
Thompson G. Marsh
James R. Jones
James D. Parriott
Frank Swancara
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Some Legal Aspects Of The Colorado Coal Strike
By EDWARD MILLER, Esq., of the Denver Bar

ON

half of the coal miners of the
October 18, 1927, about onelargest coal companies in the
Trinidad and Walsenburg districts in
the southern part of the State of Colorado went on strike. The State Industrial Commission took the position, and
probably properly so, that the strike
was illegal, basing its decision on substantial irregularities in the petition
addressed to it asking increased wages
and a change in working conditions in
all of the coal mines of the State. The
notice was filed September 6, 1927, and
was signed by six men, who, according
to a positive statement of the office of
the Attorney General in a letter to the
Industrial Commission, were not employees of the coal companies whose
miners went on strike; furthermore
the commission states that it "was
unable to find a single delegate" at a
conference previously held at Aguilar
"who was elected by his fellow workers
in a meeting assembled for that purpose". Accordingly, the commission
ruled that the strike notice was void
and the strike illegal, as to all employees who had failed to give the statutory. notice signed by themselves or
by a committee authorized for such
purpose. C. L. '21. Sec. 4353. "Employers and employees shall give to
the Industrial Commission and the one
to the other at least thirty days' prior
written notice of an intended change
affecting conditions of employment or
with respect to wages or hours." * * *
"Notice by said employees shall be
signed by said employees or members
of a committee of said employees authorized for such purpose."
The persuasive measure of picketing
was then employed and numerous
arrests followed, culminating on November 7th with the arrest of about

fifteen individuals who were supposedly the non-resident I. W. W. leaders of
the strike. They were immediately
incarcerated and according to the
newspaper reports, held incommunicado, and without bond.
These latter arrests were made by
special officers of the State Law Enforcement Department appointed by
the Governor, a department which was
originally intended for the enforcement of the State Prohibition Act. 0.
L. '21, Section 3723. "The Governor
of the State shall compel the enforcement of all provisions of this act (the
Intoxicating Liquor Act of 1915), and
for this purpose he may call upon any
State, District, County, precinct or municipal officer, or he may appoint such
agents as necessity may require * * *"
This section was construed by the
Colorado Supreme Court in the case
of Lee v. Morley, 79 Colo. 4181 in which
case the Court was called upon to declare invalid an executive order of the
Governor abolishing the law enforcement department.
The Court said,
page 484: "The heart of this dispute
lies in the phrase 'he (the Governor)
may appoint such agents as necessity
may require'. The filling of the office
or offices thus created was left to the
discretion of the Governor and he was
made the sole judge of the necessity."
But in 1918, this department came
under the Civil Service Amendment to
the Constitution, (Sec. 13, Art. XII, p.
66, C. L. '21), and with respect to that
the Court says, page 484:
"By the
terms of the civil service amendment
such agents, if appointed, come under
its provisions. If the Governor determines that ten are necessary, they
will be selected as the amendment
provides. If, in his opinion, the emergency passes and only one is required

THE DENVER BAR ASSOCIATION RECORD
the rules of the commission will determine which one. If, however, the Governor reaches the conclusion that none
is necessary no question of selection
is presented and all must go. The discretion of the Governor to determine
the necessity, under such provisions
as the one here in question was settled
in People, et al. v. Milliken, 74 Colo.
456, 458; 223 Pac. 10." There is, however, in the Rules and Regulations of
the State Civil Commission a provision
authorizing provisional and emergency
appointments by the appointing power,
until such time as the Commission
shall give an examination and complete an eligible list. A number of the
men serving in the strike area had previously passed the civil service examination and were on the eligible list for
appointments.
Almost immediately after the arrest
of the leaders a large number of miners went back to work so that on
November 9th the numbers working
in the Trinidad and Walsenburg Districts totaled approximately seventy
per centum of the number employed on
October 15th.
A picture of the evolution of labor
law lends an interesting background
for a view of the Colorado situation.
The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice
Brandeis in the case of Truax vs. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 321, gives an interesting review, which is so comprehensive
as to justify_ extensive quotation:
"In England up until 1813 a workingman struggling to improve his condition even when acting singly was
confronted with laws limiting the
amount of wages which he might demand. Until 1824 he was punishable
as a criminal if he combined with his
fellow workmen to raise wages or
shorten hours or to affect the business
in any way even if there was no resort
to a strike. In 1871, members of a
union who joined in persuading employees to leave work were liable crim-

inally, although the employees were
not under contract and the persuasion
was both peaceful and unattended by
picketing. Until 1871, threatening a
strike, whatever the cause, was also
a criminal act. Not until 1875 was the
right of workers to combine in order
to attain their ends conceded fully. In
that year Parliament declared that
workmen combining in furtherance of
a trade dispute should not be indictable for criminal conspiracy unless the
act, if done by one person, would be
indictable as a crime * * *.

But pick-

eting, though peaceful, in aid of a
strike remained illegal; and likewise
the boycott. It was not until 1906 that
the ban on peaceful picketing and the
bringing of pressure upon an employer by means of a secondary strike or
a boycott was removed * * * In England the improvement of conditions of
workingmen and their emancipation
appear to have been deemed recently
the paramount public need."
"In the United States the rules of the
common law governing the struggle
between employer and employee have
likewise been subjected to modification. These have been made mainly
through judicial decisions. The legal
right of working men to combine to
strike in order to secure for themselves higher wages, shorter hours
and better working conditions received early general recognition.
But
there developed great diversity of opinion as to the means by which and also
as to the persons through whom and
upon whom pressure might permissibly be exerted in order to induce the
employer to yield to the demands of
the working men.
Courts were required, in the absence of legislation,
to determine what the public welfare
demanded; whether it would not be
best subserved by leaving the contestants free to resort to any means not
involving a breach of the peace or injury to tangible property; whether it
was consistent with the public inter-
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est that the contestants should be permitted to invoke the aid of others not
directly interested in the matter in
controversy; and to what extent incidental injury to persons not parties
to the controversy should be held justifiable."
"The earliest reported American decision on peaceful picketing appears to
have been rendered in 1888 but the
doctrine was not established until
eight years later in the case of Vegelahn vs. Gunter, 167 Mass. 92. By no
great majority the prevailing public
opinion in American inclines towards
the legality of peaceful picketing. See
American Steel Foundries vs. Tri-City
Central Trades Council, 257 U. S. 1841.
In some of the States, notably New
York, both peaceful picketing and the
boycott are declared permissible * * *
Judges, being thus called upon to exercise a quasi-legislative function and
weigh relative social values, naturally
differed in their conclusions on such
questions."
There then evolved in this country
such a tremendous use of the injunction in labor disputes as to cause considerable criticism concerning the
abuse of the injunction. The controversy over the remedy overshadowed
in bitterness the question of the relative substantive rights of the parties.
Thoughtful lawyers throughout the
land deplored the innovation of "government by injunction," which, it was
asserted, endangered the personal liberty of wage earners. If the injunction were violated, the charges were
heard before the judge issuing the injunction, without a jury, often upon
affidavit only, and without the opportunity of confronting or cross-examining witnesses. Men found guilty of
contempt were committed in the
judge's discretion without either a statutory limit upon the length of the imprisonment or the opportunity of effective review on appeal, or the right to

release on bail pending possible revisory proceedings. In effect the proceedings were criminal except that the
individual was denied the usual constitutional safeguards and privileges in
criminal proceedings.
That was the juristic conception in
1905 when the Colorado Legislature
passed a statute providing in effect
that picketing should be unlawful, and
that the violation of the statute should
be deemed a misdemeanor subject to
a fine of not less than $10.00 nor more
than $250.00, or imprisonment in the
County Jail not to exceed sixty days,
or both, in the discretion of the Court.
C. L. '21, Sections 4162 and 166.
The following constitutional provisions are also relevant: Colorado Constitution, Article II, Section, 10, Freedom of Speech: "That no law shall
be passed impairing the freedom of
speech; that every person shall be free
to speak, write, or publish whatever
he will on any subject, being responsible for all abuses of that privilege * *
•". Colorado Constitution, Article II,
Section 19: "That all persons shall be
bailable by sufficient sureties except
for capital offenses, when the proof is
evident or the presumption great".
The act of 1915, as amended, relating
to labor disputes between employers
and employees provides, as indicated
above, for notice, and the opportunity
of investigation and arbitration by the
State Industrial Commission of the
causes of dispute between the employer and employee. Should the employees strike without such notice or the
employer cause a lockout without
notice then ,itis legislatively declared
that an injunction may issue maintaining all conditions in statu quo until the dispute is investigated by the
Commission and a final decision made
by the Commission; with the proviso
that "nothing in this Act shall prohibit the suspension or discontinuance
* *

* of any industry or of the work-
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ings of any person therein which industry is not affected with a public
interest."
The employer guilty of a
lockout is subject to a fine of not more
than One Thousand Dollars or six
months in the county jail, or both, and
each day or part of a day of such lockout constitutes a separate offense. The
employee guilty of striking contrary
to the provisions of the act is subject
to a fine of not more than $50.00 or
imprisonment for not more than six
months in the county jail, or both, and
each day or part of a day constitutes
a separate offense. Another important
criminal section of the same act provides that any person who incites, encourages or aids in any manner any
employee to go or continue on strike
contrary to the act shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor and shall be subject to a
fine of not more than One Thousand
Dollars, or imprisonment for not more
than six months in the county jail, or
both.
The injunctive section of this act
(Section 30) was construed in the case
of People v. United Mine Workers of
America, 70 Colo. 269. where the constitutionality of the statute was questioned, but sustained by the Supreme
Court. The Court said, at page 271:
"Unless coal mining may be said to be
affected with a'public interest its regulation by statute to the extent attempted by said chapter is unconstitutional.
The words 'affected with a public interest' were no doubt used by the General Assembly to keep the statute within constitutional limits. It becomes
necessary, then, not only in order to
construe the statute but to decide
whether it is constitutional, to determine whether coal mining is so affected; and it seems self-evident that it is.
We must take judicial notice of what
has taken place in this and other
States and that the coal industry is
vitally related not only to all other industries but to the health and even the
life of the people. Food, shelter and

heat, before all others, are the great
necessities of life, and in modern life,
heat means coal."
In the case of American ,iteelFoundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U. S. 193, at page 202, the court
construed Section 20 of the Clayton
Act of October 15, 1914, which provided
"That no restraining order or injunction shall be granted by any Court of
the United States in any case between
an employer and employees * * * involving, or growing out of, a dispute
concerning terms or conditions of employment, unless necessary to prevent
irreparable injury to property, or to a
property right, of the party making
the application * * *". Mr. Chief Justice Taft says:
"It is clear that Congress wished to forbid the use by the
Federal Courts of their equity arm to
prevent peaceable persuasion by employees, discharged or expectant, in
promotion of their side of the dispute,
and to secure them against judicial restraint in obtaining or communicating
information in any place where they
might lawfully be. This introluces no
new principle into the equity jurisprudence of those Courts.
It is merely
declaratory of what was the best practice always. Congress thought it wise
to stabilize the rule of action and render it uniform."
"We are a social people, and the accosting by one of another in an inoffensive way and an offer by one to communicate and discuss information with
a view to influencing the other's action, are not regarded as aggression
or a violation of that other's rights.
If, however, the offer is declined, as it
may rightfully be, then persistence,
importunity, following and dogging,
become unjustifiable annoyance and obstruction which is likely soon to savor
of intimidation."
On the same day that this case was
finally argued before the United States
Supreme Court, the case of Truax v.
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Corrigan, Supra, was also finally
argued. In that case, by a five to four
decision, a statute of the State of Arizona, similar in import and intention
and almost identical in language, with
that of Section 20 of the Clayton Act
was under discussion. But there the
Court held that the State had exceeded
its sovereign authority by depriving
an owner of a business of his property without due process of law, in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Mr. Chief Justice Taft said
there, at page 340 "We held in American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Council
that under these clauses picketing was
unlawful, and that it might be enjoined as such, and that peaceful picketing
was a contradiction in terms which the
statute sedulously avoided, but that,
subject to the primary right of the
employer and his employees and would
be employees to free access to his
premises, without obstruction by violence, intimidation, annoyance, importunity or dogging, it was lawful for exemployees on a strike and their fellows in a labor union to have a single
representative at each entrance to the
plant of the employer to announce the
strike and peaceably to persuade the
employees and would-be employees to
join them in it. We held that these
clauses were merely declaratory of
what had always been the law and the
best practice in equity, and we thus
applied them. The construction put
upon the same words by the Arizona
Supreme Court makes those clauses of
Section 1464 (the Arizona statute) as
far from those of Section 20 of the
Clayton Act in meaning as if they were
in wholly different language."
Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting said:
"There is nothing that I more deprecate than the use of the Fourteenth
Amendment beyond the absolute compulsion of its words to prevent the
making of social experiments that an
important part of the community de-

s-res, in the insulated chambers afforded by the several States."
In this 'insulated chamber' known
as the sovereign State of Colorado, at
the time of the commencement of the
strike we had taken the position that
picketing was illegal and that striking
without notice was illegal. In respect
to picketing, Colorado was committed
to the same policy as the States of New
Jersey, Minnesota and Pennsylvania.
It has been suggested that because
of the decision of the United States
Supreme Court in the case of Wolff
Packing Company v. Court of Industrial Relations of the State of Kansas,
267 U. S. 552, that Court might declare
the Colorado Act unconstitutional as
being an attempt at compulsory arbitration, and hence a deprivation of liberty without due process of law. Such
a conclusion, is doubtful, since the
Colorado act is, at most, an attempt to
induce voluntary arbitration, and to
stay the strike temporarily. The recent pronouncement of the Supreme
Court in the case of Dorchy v. Kansas,
272 U. S. 306, that "neither the common
law nor the Fourteenth Amendment
confers an absolute right to strike," is
important in that connection.
In this jurisdiction there were several lines of statutory procedure which
could have been followed. Assuming
that the employees had not given proper notice of the strike, the State upon
proper warrant could have arrested all
pickets and all strikers subject, however, to the right of the pickets and
strikers to bond and an early trial.
The State also had the right to injunctive relief maintaining the status quo
between employer and employee, in addition to the right to arrest any individual inciting, encouraging, or aiding
in the strike, subject, however, to the
right of such defendants to bond and
an early trial.
No injunction issued. Some pickets
were arrested and released on bond but
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alized and abandoned and we could not
the strike was unimpaired. A truce
answer any messages. The men went
was agreed on between the strikers
back to work and the ranks were
and the Governor, embodying the cesbroken and the strike was brokensation of picketing. The truce was
not by the army, and not by any other
short-lived and picketing was resumed.
power, but simply and solely by the
The Governor then appointed special
action of the United States courts in
enforcement
law
the
as
acting
officers
restraining us from discharging our
department to enforce the anti-picketduties as officers and representatives
conin
acting
group,
This
ing statute.
of our employees."
junction with local officers, arrested
every known leader of the I. W. W. enWe have sought to give an unbiased
couraging the strike, placed them in
review of the legal and illegal steps
jail, and held them without bail. The
taken in the strike. It is only through
effect was readily apparent. Without
the constant and impartial maintenleadership the strikers in the southern
ance of the constitutional rights of all
fields began to return to work. On
men, employers and employees, rich
November 10th a Petition for a Writ
and poor, that we can hope to preserve
of Habeas Corpus was filed in the
the just faith in a constitutional form
United States District Court at Den- of government.
Might never made
ver on behalf of the prisoners but up
right, although it has often disguised
until November 18th the defendants
itself in that cloak, to be later exposed
were still in jail and no step farther
and disgraced as an imposter.
toward the goal of freedom, except
that it then became known that
charges had been filed against the defendants and that it was possible for
them to secure their release on bond.
The habeas corpus proceedings were
then dismissed on motion of the peti(Editor's Note.-It is intended In each
tioners.
issue of the Record to note interesting
current decisions of all local Trial Courts,
In the southern field it was a condiincluding the United States District Court,
State District Courts, the County Court,
tion somewhat analogous to that deand the Justice Courts. The co-operation
of the members of the Bar is solicited in
scribed in the case of In re Debs, 158 U.
making this department a success. Any
S. 5611, 597, quoting from the testimony
attorney having knowledge of such a decision is requested to phone or mail the
of one of the defendants before the
title of the case to Victor Arthur Miller,
who will digest the decision for this deUnited States Strike Commission: "As
partment. The names of the Courts havsoon as the employees found that we
ing no material for the current month will
be omitted, due to lack of space.)
were arrested and taken from the
scene of action they became demoralized and that ended the strike. It was
DIVISION 5
not the soldiers that ended the strike;
JUDGE CHARLES SACKMAN
it was not the old brotherhoods that
People vs. Painless Parker Dentist
ended the strike. Our men were in a
Facts: Quo warranto to obtain writ
position that never would have been
of
ouster against the defendant, a Calishaken under any circumstances if we
fornia corporation, doing business in
had been permitted to remain upon the
Denver to prevent it from practising
field among them. Once we were taken
dentistry through employees and agents
from the scene of action and restrained
who are duly licensed in this state.
from sending telegrams or issuing orThe corporation has not and cannot
ders or answering questions, * * * our
headquarters were temporarily demor- get a license to practice dentistry.

Recent Trial Court
Decisions
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Demurrer is interposed to complaint.
Held: Demurrer sustained.
Reasoning: A license to practise
dentistry is not a franchise as that
word is used in the usurpation statute.
The licensing act is simply a regulatory provision under the policy powers
of the state.
As long as the persons performing the actual operation are licensed,
public interest stops at that point and
hence there is no public interest involved as is contemplated by our usurpation statute.

they must be served by mail. The statute further provides that the proceeding shall be set ahead six weeks and
attorneys often forget that where the
service is made by mail the proceeding
should be set far enough ahead to allow
for six weeks plus sufficient time for
the service by mail to be completed.
1925 Session Laws, Chap. 180, Page
542 further provides that the hearing
need not be set in open court, but may
be set by any Judge in the District in
chambers.

Note:

Slack Season

Judge Charles C. Sackman wishes to
call the attention of members of the
Bar to the following points of law
which arise quite frequently and are
often overlooked.

"Say, Jedge, Yo Honah," announced
a very large and indignant colored
woman as she dragged her scared exhusband into the courtroom, "dis no
'count man ain' paid one cent ob alimony fo' nigh onto seben months."
"What's the matter, Sam?" inquired
the judge. "Have you been out of
work?"
"Yessuh," was the reply. "Ah ain'
been able to fin' mah dice."

First, in suits for the determination
of .interest in lands of deceased persons
under statutory proceedings where the
sheriff is a party, even though only a
nominal party without pecuniary interest, for example, successor in trust,
the coroner must make the service on
all the parties, including the sheriff.
See:
General Film Co. vs. McAfee,
Sheriff, 58 Colo. 344.
Wise, et al. vs. Toner, 65 Colo. 420.
Second, in proceedings for the determination of heirship and interest in
lands, the statute provides that where
known parties to the action reside out
of the state, but their address is known
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